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Mulholland: Curtilage Concept

POT IN MY BACKYARD: CURTILAGE CONCEPT ENDORSED
BY THE QUEENS SUPREME COURT TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE OF MARIJUANA
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Theodore1
(decided February 13, 2014)
I.

INTRODUCTION

The right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure,
particularly in and around the home, has been recognized for centuries as one of the most treasured rights held by American citizens.2
The Supreme Court has stated that included within the definition of
home for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, is the land immediately surrounding the home, also known as curtilage.3
Conflicting interpretations of the Fourth Amendment by the
Supreme Court have led a number of state courts to invoke their own
constitutions in order to afford individuals greater protection4 against
unreasonable searches and seizures.5 For example, the federal open
1

980 N.Y.S.2d 148 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2014).
See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961).
3
See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
4
A state may grant its citizens greater protection under its own constitution than that offered under the Federal Constitution. See People v. Harris, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (N.Y.
1991) (“Our federalist system of government necessarily provides a double source of protection and State courts, when asked to do so, are bound to apply their own Constitutions notwithstanding the holdings of the United States Supreme Court.”).
5
See People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1330 (N.Y. 1992) (rejecting the federal open
fields doctrine and holding that the New York State Constitution provides a landowner with
a protectable privacy interest in land beyond that immediately surrounding the home, where
the landowner had taken steps to maintain privacy); State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61, 70 (Mont.
1995) (reconsidering the applicability of the federal open fields doctrine to the Montana
State Constitution because of “seeming inconsistencies in the decisions of the Supreme
Court”); State v. Johnson, 879 P.2d 984, 990 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting the Supreme
Court’s reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry because it was incompatible with the
2

811
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fields doctrine dictates that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
open fields.6 By contrast, under the New York State Constitution,
landowners are protected against unreasonable searches and seizures
in their open fields, so long as the landowner has taken steps to manifest an expectation of privacy.7
In People v. Theodore,8 the Appellate Division, Second Department held that physical evidence of marijuana should have been
suppressed due to the violations of the defendant’s rights under the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and its New
York State analogue.9 The court in Theodore found that the arresting
police officer conducted an illegal search of the defendant’s home
curtilage, when he entered the defendant’s rear yard without a warrant, and observed the defendant smoking marijuana in his car parked
at the end of the driveway.10
The case of Theodore is important because it arose in a
neighborhood densely packed with homes, where virtually no open
fields exist. The case demonstrates the willingness of New York
courts to apply the curtilage concept to a crowded urban neighborhood,11 and not simply to rural multi-acre homesteads.12 The court’s
opinion in Theodore springs from a straightforward application of
search and seizure provision of the Washington State Constitution); State v. Kirchoff, 587
A.2d 988, 994 (Vt. 1991) (rejecting the federal open fields doctrine under the Vermont State
Constitution, and holding that “[w]here the indicia, such as fences, barriers or ‘no trespassing’ signs reasonably indicate that strangers are not welcome on the land, the owner or occupant may reasonably expect privacy”); State v. Dixson, 766 P.2d 1015, 1024 (Or. 1988)
(same).
6
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. See also infra section III.B for a discussion of the federal open
fields doctrine.
7
Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1338.
8
980 N.Y.S.2d 148 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2014).
9
Id. at 150, 152.
10
Id. at 152. See also infra Section II.C (explaining that the officer’s search also did not
fall under any recognized exception to the warrant requirement).
11
See, e.g., Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1330 (holding that the New York State Constitution provides a landowner with a protectable privacy interest in land beyond that immediately surrounding the home); People v. Machovoe, 662 N.Y.S.2d 949, 950 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1997)
(affirming the county court’s decision to suppress evidence obtained after a warrantless entry
into the area behind the trailer home where defendant resided); People v. Sutton, 798
N.Y.S.2d 712 (Cnty. Ct. Jefferson County 2004) (holding that landowners in upstate New
York had protectable privacy interest in their open fields and that the officer’s warrantless
search was unlawful).
12
See, e.g., Theodore, 980 N.Y.S.2d 148; People v. Terrell, 277 N.Y.S.2d 926, 930 (Sup.
Ct. Bronx County 1967), aff'd, 291 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1968) (holding that
a fire escape was part of the curtilage of the apartment and entitled to the protection of the
Fourth Amendment).
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core constitutional principles and illustrates the ongoing vitality of
the curtilage doctrine under New York law.13
II.

PEOPLE V. THEODORE
A.

Facts

On September 29, 2011, a child called 911 reporting a residential fire.14 The child gave two addresses—123-06 Rockaway
Boulevard and 123-06 Sutphin Boulevard.15 Firefighters from a
neighboring precinct responded to the Rockaway Boulevard address,
but found no evidence of a fire.16 The 911 dispatcher handling the
call then radioed Detective Anderson of the New York City Police
Department to investigate the second address, 123-06 Sutphin Boulevard.17 Upon arriving at the second address, Detective Anderson
found neither a fire nor a house, but a vacant lot.18
Detective Anderson went to the house closest to the empty
lot—123-09 Sutphin Boulevard.19 The detective did not ring the
doorbell; instead, he walked about thirty feet down a walkway to the
left of the house, turned right, and proceeded into the rear yard.20
From there Detective Anderson saw Rashid Theodore rolling a marijuana cigarette in a car parked at the end of his driveway. 21 Detective
Anderson walked towards the car, announced that he was investigating a fire, and instructed Theodore to step out of the vehicle. 22 Once
Theodore exited the car, Detective Anderson saw a firearm on the
driver’s seat; Anderson quickly seized the gun and drug paraphernalia, and arrested Theodore.23

13

Theodore, 980 N.Y.S.2d at 150-52.
Id. at 150.
15
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, New York v. Theodore, No. 14-329, 2014 WL 4704642,
at *3 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t Sept. 2, 2014).
16
Theodore, 980 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15, at *4.
22
Id. at *2.
23
Theodore, 980 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
14
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Procedural History

Theodore was charged in the Queens County Supreme Court
with two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and one count of criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth
degree.24 The defendant sought, “inter alia, to suppress the physical
evidence” seized on the night of his arrest.25 He argued that the police obtained the evidence in a manner that violated his Fourth
Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure.26 The
supreme court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress.27 Theodore “subsequently pled guilty to the entire indictment” and received
a prison sentence of three and one-half years.28
C.

Appellate Division, Second Department

Theodore appealed to the Appellate Division of the Second
Judicial Department of New York.29 The appellate court considered
whether the supreme court properly denied the defendant’s motion to
suppress evidence, or should have excluded the evidence and dismissed the indictment.30 The court explained that the protection of
the Fourth Amendment, in addition to the analogous provision of the
New York State Constitution, is triggered when police invade an individual’s constitutionally protected privacy interest.31 Therefore, to
sustain the supreme court’s ruling, the Appellate Division had to find
that Detective Anderson lawfully was in a position to make his observations.32 The Government argued that Detective Anderson’s warrantless entry into the defendant’s rear yard fell within the emergency
aid exception33 to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and
24

Id. at 148, 150.
Id. at 150.
26
Id. at 150-51.
27
Id. at 150.
28
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15, at *5.
29
Theodore, 980 N.Y.S.2d at 148, 150.
30
Id. at 150.
31
Id. at 151-52.
32
Id. at 152.
33
The emergency aid exception applies when police reasonably believe that an emergency
exists requiring their assistance, and “there was some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.” Id. at 151.
Theodore involved two issues: curtilage and the emergency aid exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement. This case note discusses only the curtilage issue.
25
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the court properly admitted the evidence under the plain view doctrine.34
The Appellate Division reversed and held that Detective Anderson’s observations were not made from a lawfully obtained point
of view because he was within Theodore’s curtilage, and additionally
that no Fourth Amendment exception applied.35
The court explained that curtilage may be determined by considering four factors: (1) proximity of the area to the home itself; (2)
whether the area is located “within an enclosure surrounding the
home”36; (3) the “nature of the uses to which the area is put” 37; and
(4) the steps taken towards ensuring privacy from passers-by.38 The
court issued a brief statement concluding that the defendant’s rear
yard was within the curtilage because it “was in close proximity to
the home, shielded from view by those on the street, and within the
natural and artificial barriers enclosing the home.”39
D.

What Was Missing from the Appellate Division’s
Opinion

The court’s curtilage analysis was less than rigorous. Notably
absent from the opinion was any attempt to canvas the facts concerning the defendant’s rear yard—a step critical to a properly detailed
curtilage analysis. Thus, the court left a number of unanswered questions. Specifically, what sort of “natural and artificial barriers”40
must exist to compel a finding of curtilage in an urban New York
neighborhood? What was the nature of the thirty-foot walkway on
which Detective Anderson traveled?41 Also, did a clear boundary exist between the walkway and the rear yard?42
The Appellate Division’s superficial analysis is nevertheless
telling. The absence of any nuanced details, which might have pointed towards a different outcome, indicates that Fourth Amendment
34
Theodore, 980 N.Y.S.2d at 151-52 (explaining the plain view doctrine applies when the
investigating officer sees incriminating evidence from a lawfully obtained point of view).
35
Id. at 148, 152.
36
Id. at 151 (quoting United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301(1987)).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Theodore, 980 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
40
Id. at 151.
41
Id. at 150.
42
Id.
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protections are liberally enforced in the Second Department—readily
embraced by a critical court with responsibility for core segments of
urban New York.
III.

FOURTH AMENDMENT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in relevant part: “[t]he right of the people to be secure, in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures . . . .”43 The Supreme Court of the United
States has identified the entrance to the home as a bright line for
Fourth Amendment protection.44 Included within the protected area
of the home, is the curtilage, or “land immediately surrounding and
associated with the home.”45 The Supreme Court has established that
Fourth Amendment protection does not extend to “open fields”46 or
areas within the view of the general public.47
In 1914, the United States Supreme Court announced the “exclusionary rule,”48 explaining that evidence obtained in a manner violative of the Fourth Amendment would not be permitted to establish
a defendant’s guilt in federal court.49 In 1961, the Court in Mapp v.
Ohio50 extended the exclusionary rule and made it applicable to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.51 Consequently, the general rule today is that when an unlawful search or seizure occurs, a defendant may move to have the illegally obtained evidence excluded under the Fourth Amendment.52
A.

Fourth Amendment Analysis: Property vs. Privacy

Until 1967, Fourth Amendment decisions were based, primarily, upon notions of physical trespass and real property law.53 The
43

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
45
See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
46
See generally Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
47
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
48
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
49
Id. at 398.
50
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
51
Id. at 660.
52
Id.
53
See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (upholding the government’s eavesdropping because it had not been accomplished by means of actual physical in44
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main issue courts have considered in Fourth Amendment cases prior
to this period was whether the government’s search or seizure physically invaded a constitutionally protected “place” or “material
thing.”54
A major turning point in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
came in 1967, when the Supreme Court decided Katz v. United
States.55 The defendant in Katz moved to suppress incriminating evidence of interstate gambling that the government obtained using a
wiretapping device placed on a public telephone booth.56 In this
landmark decision, the Supreme Court announced that the Fourth
Amendment exists to protect “people, not places.”57 The Court reasoned that because the defendant justifiably relied on the privacy of
the phone booth to shield his conversation from uninvited listeners,
he did not forfeit his right to privacy “simply because he made his
calls from a place where he might be seen.”58
Arguably, the most important aspect of the Katz case was Justice Harlan’s concurrence. Justice Harlan outlined his understanding
of the two-prong test which the Court adopted as the standard to determine when individuals can successfully assert a Fourth Amendment violation: “there is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as ‘reasonable.’ ”59

vasion); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942); Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511
(declining to uphold the government’s eavesdropping because the “spike mike” utilized
physically encroached upon the petitioner’s premises).
54
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (explaining that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs only
when “there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his
papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure”); but see id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing for privacy-based, rather than property-based Fourth Amendment protections).
55
389 U.S. 347 (1967). See also Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177 (describing the Katz test as the
“touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis”).
56
Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-49.
57
Id. at 351.
58
Id. at 352. The Court explained:
The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from which
the petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he
was as visible after he entered it as he would have been if he had remained outside. But what he sought to exclude when he entered the
booth was not the intruding eye — it was the uninvited ear.
Id.
59
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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The Court in Katz recognized, for the first time, that the
Fourth Amendment’s protection does not turn on the defendant’s
physical location when the search occurred, but what level and form
of privacy the defendant was reasonably entitled to expect.60 Following Katz, the Court began applying Justice Harlan’s privacy test—
apparently in place of the former property-based test—to resolve
questions regarding the scope of the Fourth Amendment.61
B.

No Privacy in Open Fields

Seventeen years after Katz the Supreme Court, in Oliver v.
United States,62 sought to reaffirm the vitality of the long-standing
open fields doctrine.63 Oliver consolidated the appeals of two cases
with nearly identical fact patterns.64 Acting on anonymous or unverified tips, law enforcement agents ignored “No Trespassing”65 signs
and fences, entered private property, and observed marijuana plants.66
Subsequently, both defendants were arrested and indicted for
manufacturing controlled substances.67 Petitioner Oliver argued that
under the rule of Katz, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his field because he “had done all that could be expected of him to
assert his privacy in the area of the farm that was searched.”68 The
Sixth Circuit held that Katz should not apply to open fields, because
“ ‘human relations that create the need for privacy do not ordinarily
take place’ in open fields.”69
The majority employed a plain language interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment—arguably a step backwards from the approach
taken in Katz—and held that the open fields doctrine was still good

60

Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (explaining that the application
of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the individual seeking its protection passes
Justice Harlan’s two-part Katz test); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (explaining that the old Fourth Amendment common-law trespass doctrine had been repudiated
by the new Katz expectation of privacy doctrine).
62
466 U.S. 170 (1984).
63
Id. at 174.
64
Id. at 173-74.
65
Id. at 173.
66
Id. at 173-74.
67
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173-74.
68
Id. at 173 (citations omitted).
69
Id. at 174 (quoting United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 360 (6th Cir. 1982)).
61
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law.70 The Court reasoned that because the Amendment seeks only
to protect people, houses, papers, and effects, no protectable privacy
interest could attach to an open field.71
As a secondary line of reasoning, the Court rejected Oliver’s
Katz argument. The Court wrote that an individual cannot reasonably
expect privacy in an open field because an open field is generally accessible to the public and to police surveillance.72 The Court explained that open fields are different from curtilage, because curtilage
is viewed as an extension of the home itself—“the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s
home and the privacies of life.’ ”73 By contrast, the majority found
no societal interest in protecting the privacy of activities that typically
occur in open fields, such as crop cultivation.74
The Court also stated that the illegal nature of the defendants’
activities (i.e., growing marijuana) lessened the legitimacy of their
privacy expectations under Katz.75 The Court concluded that no matter how many “No Trespassing” signs the defendants had posted,
their expectations of privacy in the open fields were neither reasonable nor “legitimate in the sense required by the Fourth Amendment.”76
Justice Marshall issued a dissenting opinion in Oliver, calling
attention to a number of inconsistencies in the majority’s reasoning.77
First, he argued that the Oliver majority’s plain-language interpretation directly contradicted the Court’s other post-Katz decisions, none
of which the Court intended to overrule. 78 Justice Marshall pointed
out that “neither a telephone booth nor a conversation conducted
therein”79 could be characterized as a “person, house, paper, or effect,”80 yet Katz established that both are nevertheless protected.81
70

Id. at 176-77.
Id. at 178 n.7 (“The Framers would have understood the term ‘effects’ to be limited to
personal, rather than real, property.”) (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 16,
384-85)); id. at 180-81.
72
Id. at 179.
73
Id. at 180 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
74
Id. at 179.
75
Id. at 182 n.13.
76
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182-83.
77
Id. at 185 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 185 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015

9

Touro Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 4 [2015], Art. 10

820

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 31

He observed that curtilage similarly does not fall into any of these
categories, yet curtilage too has been granted Fourth Amendment
protection.82 Further, Justice Marshall indicated that contrary to the
Court’s contention, Oliver’s field was not accessible to the general
public or the police.83 In fact, the field was shielded from view completely by trees, fences, and other natural embankments.84
Justice Marshall concluded his dissent by stating a rule that he
believed would best serve citizens, law enforcement, and the lower
courts:
Private land marked in a fashion sufficient to render
entry thereon a criminal trespass under the law of the
State in which the land lies is protected by the Fourth
Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches
and seizures. One of the advantages of the foregoing
rule is that it draws upon a doctrine already familiar to
both citizens and government officials. In each jurisdiction, a substantial body of statutory and case law
defines the precautions a landowner must take in order
to avail himself of the sanctions of the criminal law.
The police know that body of law, because they are
entrusted with responsibility for enforcing it against
the public; it therefore would not be difficult for the
police to abide by it themselves.85
To the contrary, Justice Marshall predicted that the majority’s rule
would create an influx of litigation because it would require police to
make “on-the-spot judgments as to how far curtilage extends,”86 just
to be litigated later by courts on a case-by-case basis.87
82

Id. at 185-86. Justice Marshall argued:
Indeed, the Court's reading of the plain language of the Fourth Amendment is incapable of explaining even its own holding in this case. The
Court rules that the curtilage, a zone of real property surrounding a
dwelling, is entitled to constitutional protection. We are not told, however, whether the curtilage is a ‘house’ or an ‘effect’—or why, if the curtilage can be incorporated into the list of things and spaces shielded by
the Amendment, a field cannot.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
83
Id. at 184-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84
Id. at 174.
85
Id. at 195.
86
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 195-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87
Id. at 196.
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In sum, Oliver instructed that Fourth Amendment protection
would not extend to land falling outside of the curtilage, regardless of
steps taken to assure privacy.88 However, the majority offered little
guidance on how to distinguish between curtilage and open fields.89
The opinion also left unaddressed the issue of whether and to what
extent the curtilage concept might apply in a relatively dense urban
environment.
IV.

POST-OLIVER CURTILAGE: CURTILAGE OR OPEN FIELDS

Four years later, in United States v. Dunn,90 the Supreme
Court attempted to shed light on the issues left open in Oliver.91 Specifically, it analyzed how law enforcement officers and lower courts
should determine where the curtilage ends and the open fields
begin.92 The defendants in Dunn were charged with manufacturing a
controlled substance after Drug Enforcement Agents observed evidence of illicit drug activity through the window of the defendant’s
barn.93 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the barn fell
within the curtilage, which would have rendered unlawful the officer’s visual flashlight search conducted through the barn window.94
Drawing from its own previous cases, the Supreme Court
proposed four factors to assist lower courts in resolving the question
of whether an area is intimately tied to the home itself: (1) the proximity of the land in question to the home; (2) whether the land is
within an enclosure surrounding the home; (3) the nature of its use;
and (4) the steps taken towards ensuring privacy in the land.95 The
Court further added that these factors will not “produce[] a finely
tuned formula that, when mechanically applied, yields a ‘correct’ answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions. Rather, these factors are
useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they
bear upon the centrally relevant consideration.”96 The Court ultimately concluded that Dunn’s barn was not within the curtilage be88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id. at 179.
Id. at 180 n.11.
480 U.S. 294 (1987).
Id. at 296.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 298-99.
Id. at 299-300.
Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301.
Id. at 301.
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cause (1) it was located sixty yards away from the home itself; (2) it
was located fifty yards outside of the fenced area that surrounded the
home; (3) the officers believed that it was being used as a drug lab;
and (4) a separate fence surrounding the barn offered no privacy because it was “constructed to corral livestock, not to prevent persons
from observing what lay inside the enclosed areas.”97
Justice Brennan, who was joined by Justice Marshall, authored a dissenting opinion that rejected the majority’s opinion in its
entirety.98 He believed that the majority’s application of the four-part
test disregarded the significance of a barn to rural life.99 Justice
Brennan wrote that the Court’s willingness to reject privacy in open
fields, and its unwillingness to recognize privacy in the defendant’s
barn, “are manifestly inconsistent and reflect a hostility to the purpose of the Fourth Amendment.”100
Since Dunn, courts have varied in their interpretations of the
four factors, further demonstrating that there are neither clear-cut answers, nor bright line rules useful for resolving questions of home
curtilage.101
V.

THE NEW YORK STATE APPROACH
A.

Open Fields in New York

In 1992, the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Scott102
considered whether to adopt the Supreme Court’s ruling in Oliver regarding the open fields doctrine.103 The Court of Appeals rejected the
federal open fields doctrine because of its uncertainty, and implemented a standard that it believed would better protect its citizens’

97

Id. at 302-03.
Id. at 307 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99
Id.
100
Dunn, 480 U.S. at 310 (emphases added).
101
See, e.g., United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1278 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying “actual
use” test to determine what actual uses were made of the alleged curtilage, and analyzing
whether those uses qualified as “intimate activities of the home”); contra United States v.
Shates, 915 F. Supp. 1483, 1498 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (considering the officers’ objective observations of the alleged curtilage to determine nature of use factor); see also United States v.
Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205, 209 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (“[T]here are no bright lines that determine
where the curtilage of a home ends.”), rev’d on other grounds, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995).
102
593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992).
103
Id. at 1330.
98
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privacy rights.104 The New York State Constitution now protects privately owned open fields against unreasonable searches and seizures,
as long as the landowner has made efforts on the land to manifest an
expectation of privacy.105
The case of Scott presented facts remarkably similar to those
considered by the Supreme Court in Oliver.106 Law enforcement officers received information from a private citizen that marijuana was
being grown in a field on the defendant’s property.107 Despite clear
signs prohibiting trespassing, the officers subsequently searched the
field, seized evidence, and arrested the defendant on charges of criminal possession of marijuana.108 The court ultimately held that Oliver
“d[id] not adequately protect [the] fundamental constitutional rights”
of New York citizens.109
The majority cited three main reasons for its decision.110
First, the court explained that the rule of Oliver is contrary to New
York decisions regarding searches and seizures.111 The court wrote
that since Katz, New York courts have consistently applied the rule
that the Fourth Amendment “protects a person’s privacy, not particular places”112 and to adopt the rule of Oliver would undermine New
York law.113
Second, the court found Oliver to be in direct conflict with
“the right to be let alone”114—a core New York principle.115 This
right, the court explained, is rooted in New York search and seizure
jurisprudence, and is similarly recognized by the legislature through
the enactment of statutes.116 Specifically, the court found that New
York’s criminal trespass statute117 represented a societal recognition
104

Id. at 1338.
Id.
106
Id. at 1330-31.
107
Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1330-31.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 1337.
111
Id. at 1335.
112
Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1334.
113
Id. at 1336.
114
Id. at 1335 (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.10(a) (McKinney 2012) (“A person is guilty of criminal
trespass in the third degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building or
upon real property (a) which is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to ex105
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of the right to exclude the public as “one of the most treasured
strands in [a New York] owner’s bundle of property rights.”118
Finally, the court took issue with the Supreme Court’s proposition that “the very conduct discovered by the government’s illegal
trespass (i.e., growing marijuana) could be considered as a relevant
factor in determining whether the police had violated defendant’s
rights.”119 Agreeing with Justice Marshall’s Oliver dissent, the court
reasoned that Fourth Amendment protections should not turn on the
legality of the activities sought to be kept private.120 The court found
“[s]uch after-the-fact-justification”121 to be incompatible with New
York’s longstanding recognition of fundamental fairness in criminal
justice.122
As an additional line of reasoning, the court found that Oliver
was incompatible with New York law because Oliver “presupposes
the ideal of a conforming society,”123 where law-abiding citizens
should have nothing to hide.124 According to Scott, this rationale
seemed contrary to New York’s tradition of tolerating “the unconventional . . . bizarre or even offensive.”125 The court concluded that for
these reasons, it was compelled to reject Oliver, and turn instead to
the analogous provision of the New York State Constitution to adequately safeguard its citizens’ rights.126
B.

New York Curtilage

During the years since Scott, New York courts consistently
have invoked the curtilage concept to exclude evidence seized from
clude intruders.”).
118
Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1335-36 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)). The court wrote that it would not ignore the police’s
commission of both civil and criminal trespass when they searched the defendants’ properties. Id. at 1336. Quoting Justice Brandeis, the court explained, “ ‘Our Government is the
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for
law.’ ” Id. (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
119
Id. at 1336.
120
Id. at 1333-34 n.2, 1336. For a discussion of Justice Marshall’s dissent in Oliver, see
supra text accompanying notes 77-87.
121
Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1336.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 1337.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1338.
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non-rural home yards. In People v. Saurini,127 the Appellate Division
for the Fourth Judicial Department held that the warrantless seizure
of marijuana plants growing in flower beds immediately behind the
defendant’s home could not be justified by either the plain view or
open fields doctrines because the police officers made their observations from an adjoining neighbor’s rear yard.128
In People v. Vernon B.,129 the Supreme Court, Kings County,
held that the defendant’s unkempt rear yard was within the curtilage
of his Brooklyn home, and thus fell under the home’s umbrella of
Fourth Amendment protection.130 In Vernon B., a police officer allegedly observed the defendant toss a black bag out of his bedroom
window.131 The officer then jumped over the defendant’s fence to retrieve the discarded bag containing a loaded handgun.132 The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and moved to
suppress the evidence on the grounds that the officer’s warrantless
search and seizure were unlawful.133
The court conducted the four-factor Dunn analysis and held
that the yard, although overgrown and seemingly neglected, was
within the curtilage because the resident intended that it be treated as
part of the home.134 The yard was immediately next to the home, extended behind the home for only twenty feet, and was enclosed by a
fence.135 Although the fence was chain-linked and did not shield the
yard from public view, the court found that the resident took steps to
protect the yard from public view because it was overgrown with
vegetation.136 The court stated that the record shed no light as to the
nature of use factor, but deduced from the overgrowth of vegetation
127

607 N.Y.S.2d 518 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1994).
Id. at 519. But see Commonwealth v. Busfield, 363 A.2d 1227, 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1976). Police obtained permission from the defendant’s neighbor to look into defendant’s
kitchen window from the neighbor’s adjoining property. Id. The court admitted the officer’s
observations as evidence and held that “even though a [sheer] curtain was drawn across the
window,” the defendant “exposed his transactions to the public.” Id.
129
954 N.Y.S.2d 835, 838 (Crim. Ct. Kings County 2012).
130
Vernon B., 954 N.Y.S.2d at 838 (quoting Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300-01). The court ultimately excused the officer’s warrantless search and seizure because it found that the Fourth
Amendment exigent circumstance exception applied. Id. at 841.
131
Id. at 837.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 836.
134
Vernon B., 954 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
135
Id.
136
Id.
128
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that it must have been neglected.137 Nevertheless, the court found
that the vegetation could be viewed as a “step taken by the resident to
protect the yard from observation.”138 The court concluded, rather
dubiously, that the yard qualified as curtilage.139
The court also went on to say that the officer’s unlicensed entry onto the defendant’s property was “consistent with New York’s
statutory definition of trespass.”140 Therefore, although the officer
made his observation from a lawful vantage point (i.e., outside the
curtilage), he “trespass[ed] onto a constitutionally protected area”141
when he jumped over the fence into the defendant’s rear yard.142
New York courts in cases such as Theodore and Vernon B.
consistently have endorsed the curtilage doctrine to include urban
yards within the home’s protected core.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As the Supreme Court has revisited the Fourth Amendment
over time, it has expanded the basic concepts of home protection to
embrace various American developments such as multi-acre homesteads and urban home-sites. Today, the home as a concept is defined expansively for purposes of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
and includes all of the various settings within which Americans live.
New York’s protection of the home against unreasonable
searches and seizures exceeds the protection available under the Federal Constitution. Illustrative in this regard, New York citizens who
live in the wide-open country with enormous tracts of land remain
entitled to a cognizable level of home-invasion protection, so long as
the landowner has made efforts to maintain privacy. Citizens who
live in densely populated urban settings also have curtilage rights, as
demonstrated in People v. Theodore.143 It is understandable and quite
predictable that a court such as the Second Department, responsible
for one of the most densely populated urban environments in the nation, would not hesitate to defer to the expectation of privacy in the

137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id.
Id.
Vernon B., 954 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
Id. at 838-39.
Id. at 839.
Id.
980 N.Y.S.2d 148 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2014).
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backyard typical for that particular neighborhood.
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